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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Jevne v. Superior Court*
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and other
securities self-regulatory organizations (SROs) will no longer require
California-based participants in arbitration proceedings to waive conflicting
California standards or to agree to arbitrate disputes outside of California. I In
Jevne v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held that the
California Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration
(California Standards) were preempted by the rules for neutral arbitrators
promulgated by the NASD. 2 Specifically, the court held that the California
Standards' provisions on disclosure and disqualification conflicted with the
corresponding NASD arbitration rules, and were thus preempted by federal
securities laws. 3
The NASD adopted its first set of arbitration rules in 1968 with the hope
of aiding a growing number of small investors who found themselves
involved in disputes with their brokers.4 Currently, the NASD operates the
largest dispute resolution forum in the securities industry. 5 While investors
were the primary beneficiaries under the original rules,6 subsequent
developments have also benefited securities dealers by allowing them to
* Jevne v. Superior Ct., 111 P.3d 954 (Cal. 2005).
'See Jevne v. Superior Ct., 111 P.3d 954 (Cal. 2005); Order Granting Accelerated
Approval of Proposed Rule Change of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure Relating
to the Waiver of the California Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual
Arbitration, 70 Fed. Reg. 35,482 (June 30, 2005) [hereinafter California Ethics Standards
for Neutral Arbitrators].
2 Jevne, 111 P.3d at 963.
3 Id. at 969.
4 See Deborah Masucci, Securities Arbitration-A Success Story: What Does the
Future Hold?, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 183, 185 (1996).
5 See NASD Dispute Resolution,
http://www.nasd.com/ArbitrationMediation/index.htm (last visited August 1, 2006). The
self-described purpose of NASD Dispute Resolution is to "assist in the resolution of
monetary and business disputes between and among investors, securities firms, and
individual registered representatives." Id.
6 See Masucci, supra note 4, at 185. Initially arbitration was voluntary for both sides,
but subsequent changes allowed individual investors to compel members and associated
persons to arbitrate disputes. Id. (citing NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 12
(1995)).
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utilize pre-dispute arbitration agreements as a means to contain litigation
costs and reduce exposure.7 This trend continued in 1987, when the U.S.
Supreme Court validated the binding effect of the pre-dispute arbitration
agreements commonly placed in customer account agreements by securities
dealers.8
Although the NASD and other SROs consider arbitration to be a quick
and cost-efficient alternative to litigation in which qualified neutral
arbitrators serve to protect the rights of investors, 9 concerns over the
adequacy of the process continue to exist among investors and lawmakers. 10
These individuals are concerned that the procedures and extensive
involvement of industry insiders tend to provide an unfair advantage to
brokerage firms and other repeat players.11
These concerns are not limited to securities dispute arbitration, but are
increasingly present in all contractual arbitrations. In response to these
concerns, the California Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure
§ 1281.85(a) in 2001.12 The statute directed the California Judicial Council to
establish ethical standards for neutral arbitrators serving under the direction
of contractual arbitration agreements. 13 The Judicial Council responded by
adopting the California Standards, which were subsequently enacted on July
1, 2002.14
The Judicial Council chose not to exempt SRO-administered securities
arbitrations from the newly enacted standards, 15 and the SROs immediately
challenged the Judicial Council's position. The basis for the challenge was
their contention that the California Standards contained provisions that
conflicted with the NASD Code and were therefore preempted. 16 The
7 See Norman S. Poser, Making Securities Arbitration Work, 50 SMU L. REv. 277,
280-87 (1996).
8 See American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
9 See Securities Industry Association, Arbitration Is Fair, Fast and Economical for
Investors, Jan. 29, 2004, http://www.sia.com/press/pdf/ArbitrationTalkingPoints2003.pdf.
10 See Jill I. Gross, Securities Mediation: Dispute Resolution for the Individual
Investor, 21 O1o ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 329, 338 (2006).
llId.
12 See Cal. Assem. Com. On Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 475 (2001-2002
Reg. Sess.).
13 See Jevne v. Superior Ct., 111 P.3d 954, 962-63 (Cal. 2005).
14 Id. at 957.
15 Id. at 960 n.4.
16 Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Jevne v. Superior Ct., 111 P.3d 954 (Cal. 2005) (No. B 167044), 2003 WL
23140037.
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outcome of these challenges held enormous importance not only for the
SROs, but also for securities dealers and individual investors. As such, the
court's holding in Jevne represents the most recent chapter in the
development of arbitration in the securities industry.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1996, Jack Jevne opened an account in the name of Avalon
Investments, S.A. (Avalon) with JB Oxford & Company (Oxford), a licensed
securities broker dealer and member of the NASD. 17 In order to open the
account, Jevne was required to sign an "account opening statement," which
directed that all disputes with Oxford would be resolved through arbitration
in accordance with the NASD Code.' 8 A dispute arose over Oxford's
handling of the account, and suit was filed on behalf of Jevne and Avalon in
August of 2000.19
Pursuant to the provisions of the account opening statement, the parties
initially agreed to resolve their dispute through arbitration.20 In September of
2002, an individual on the arbitration panel disqualified himself for
undisclosed reasons, and the panel put the proceedings on hold pending the
replacement of the disqualified member.21
The California Judicial Council's recent enactment of the California
Standards on July 1, 2002 further complicated matters. As a result of
perceived conflicts between the provisions of the NASD Code and the
California Standards, the NASD stopped appointing arbitrators for California
disputes unless the parties agreed to sign a waiver of the California Standards
or agreed to continue the arbitration in another state.22
Jevne refused to sign the waiver, and instead, he sought to restore the
matter to the active civil trial calendar.23 The trial court denied Jevne's
motion and the court of appeals affirmed the decision.24 The court of appeals
denied a rehearing on the matter, and the California Supreme Court granted




21 Id. at 959.
22 Id.
23 Jevne, 111 P.3d at 959.
24 Id. at 960.
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review to determine whether the corresponding provisions of the NASD
Code preempted the California Standards.25
III. THE COURT'S HOLDING AND REASONING
The California Supreme Court held that NASD rules, which the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) approved pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
§ 78s(b)(2), preempted state law when the two were in conflict.26 After
acknowledging that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) contained no
provision for express preemption and that the field of securities arbitration
was not one that Congress intended the federal government to occupy
exclusively, the court focused its analysis of preemption on the alleged
conflict between the NASD Code and the California Standards. 27
To find preemption based on conflict between federal and state law, the
court first had to establish that the NASD Code held the force of federal
law.28 The court then had to establish the existence of a conflict between the
NASD Code and the California Standards.29
A. Preemptive Force of the NASD Code
In order to find preemption through conflict, the court needed to establish
that the NASD Code carried the force of federal law. The court's conclusion
that the NASD Code carried the force of federal law was derived, in large
part, from Congress's 1975 Amendment to § 19 of the SEA, which
substantially altered the balance of rulemaking power in favor of oversight
by the SEC.30 More precisely, the amendment removed the SROs' authority
for independent regulation, and granted the SEC "broad authority to oversee
and to regulate the rules adopted by the SROs relating to customer disputes,
including the power to mandate the adoption of any rules it deems necessary
to ensure that arbitration procedures adequately protect statutory rights."3 1
25 Id. at 958.
2 6 Id at 960.
27 See id. at 964.
28Id.
29 See Jevne, 111 P.3d at 964.
30 Id. at 966.
31 Id. (quoting American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233-234 (1987)).
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The court determined that the SEC's approval of an NASD rule was an
"expression of federal policy that may have preemptive effect" so long as the
requisite conflict exists. 32
B. Conflict Between the NASD Code and the California Standards
After determining that the NASD Code could, under the right
circumstances, carry the force of federal law, the court's analysis turned to
the question of whether a genuine conflict existed between the California
Standards and the NASD Code. The court explained that conflict preemption
applies in two situations: (1) when it is impossible to comply with both the
federal and the state law, and (2) when enforcement of state law could
prevent or impair the accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of
federal law.33
The court restricted its review to Standards 7, 8, and 10 of the California
Standards because those were the standards previously found to be in conflict
by the court of appeals.34 The court held that Standards 7 and 8, which
related to heightened disclosure requirements, conflicted with the NASD
Code because they impaired the accomplishment of the objectives of investor
protection found in the SEA.35 Specifically, the court found that the
California disclosure standards would increase administrative costs, deter the
participation of qualified arbitrators, and ultimately, increase the complexity,
cost, and uncertainty of the arbitration process. 36
The court also found a conflict with regard to Standard 10, which related
to arbitrator disqualification, because the standard was "fundamentally
irreconcilable" with the corresponding NASD Code provisions. 37
Specifically, the court noted that if an arbitrator failed to make a required
disclosure and a party served notice of disqualification, the California
Standards required disqualification, while the NASD Code granted discretion
to the NASD Director of Arbitration to decide whether the disqualification
should occur. 38
32 Id. at 966 (emphasis in original).
33 Id. at 964.
3 4 Id. at 966.
35 Jevne, 111 P.3d at 969-70.
36 See id. at 968-69.
37 Id. at 970.
3 8 Id.
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IV. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S RULING
The court's holding that the California Standards are preempted by the
provisions of the NASD Code to the extent that they attempt to regulate
SRO-administered securities arbitrations has far-reaching implications for the
future of SRO directed arbitrations, the California Standards, and the use of
alternative dispute resolution within the field of securities-related disputes.
A. The Future of SRO Arbitration
The ruling of the Jevne Court was a decisive victory for the NASD and
other SROs to the extent that the decision acknowledged the status of SROs
in general, and of the NASD in particular, as the preeminent forums for the
arbitration of securities-related disputes. 39 The ruling sent a clear message
that state laws which conflict with or curtail the authority of SROs in the
field of securities-related dispute arbitrations will not survive a legal
challenge.40
Following the Jevne decision in the California Supreme Court and a
similar holding in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 41 the NASD and other
SROs quickly altered their rules to effectuate the courts' holdings.42 Prior to
Jevne, the NASD required California participants to either waive the
California Standards or to agree to arbitrate the dispute outside of the state.43
Following the Jevne decision, the NASD declared its authority and removed
the waiver requirements. 44
In addition to acknowledging the superiority of SRO arbitration rules, the
ruling also put the NASD in a position to better effectuate the goals of the
SEA. By removing the burden of heightened disclosure requirements, the
39 See Continuing California ADR Developments, 59 DISP. RESOL. J. 6, 6 (2004).
4 0 See, e.g., Schachle v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, No. G032194, 2005
WL 1822517 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2005); Gorman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. H027488, 2005 WL 1576869 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. July 5,
2005).
41 See Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 400 F.3d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
42 See California Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators, 70 Fed. Reg. 35,482
(June 20, 2005); Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Order Audit Trial Systems
Rules, 70 Fed. Reg. 57,909, 57,916 (Oct. 4, 2005); Notice of Filing and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change to Rule 600, Relating to Arbitration, 70
Fed. Reg. 76,094 (Dec. 22, 2005).
43 NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, rule IM- 10100(f), repealed by California
Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators, 70 Fed. Reg. 35,482.
44 See California Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators, 70 Fed. Reg. 35,482.
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Jevne decision ensured that the most qualified arbitrators would not be
dissuaded from participating in the process.45 The decision also made it
easier for the SEC to establish consistent nationwide procedures for the
arbitration of securities disputes.46
B. The Future of the California Standards
While the court's ruling was clearly a defeat for the California
Standards,47 the ruling only struck down the California Standards' ability to
influence SRO-administered arbitrations. As to all other commercial
arbitrations in California, the Standards remain in full force. 48
Just as the Jevne decision generated quick authorization for SRO rule
changes at the SEC, the California Judicial Council was also quick to act on
the court's ruling.49 Following Jevne, the Judicial Council proposed an
amendment that would exempt securities dispute arbitrations from the
coverage of the California Standards. 50 The Judicial Council also seized upon
this opportunity to begin a larger dialogue concerning the overall validity and
functionality of the California Standards.51 Motivated by the outcome in
Jevne, the California dispute resolution community appears eager to
participate in this dialogue. 52
45 See Follow Up: Comment Period Is Reopened for California Arbitrator Ethics
Standards, 24 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 8, 9 (2006). John Blackman, current
president of the California Dispute Resolution Council, has described the problems with
the California Standards, "There are so many traps or ambiguities that crop up when you
do or say things. ... We're losing quality arbitrators." Id.
46 See Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 16, at * 11.
47 See supra note 39.
48 See Jevne v. Superior Ct., 111 P.3d 954, 972 (Cal. 2005).
49 See Request for Comments on Current Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators,
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/invitationstocomment/documents/spO5-10.pdf (last visited
Sept. 27, 2006).
50 Id. The proposed amendment would state: "These standards do not apply to any
arbitrator serving in an arbitration proceeding governed by rules adopted by a securities
self-regulatory organization and approved by the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission under federal law." Id.
51 See id. (requesting comments and suggestions on how to improve all of the
California Standards).
52 See supra note 45.
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C. The Future of ADR in Securities-Related Disputes
Participants in the arbitration process will not see many changes as a
result of the outcome in Jevne because the holding, in effect, directed that the
existing SRO arbitration procedures should remain in place. As such, the
same benefits and detriments perceived by parties prior to Jevne still exist
after the ruling. Many will continue to view arbitration as a speedy,
inexpensive, and fair alternative to litigation, 53 while others will continue to
view SRO-directed arbitration as an option which increasingly resembles
traditional litigation and also tends to benefit securities dealers at the expense
of individual investors. 54
The ruling in Jevne effectively forecloses any future challenges to the
supremacy of SRO standards for the arbitration of securities-related
disputes.55 With this consolidation of power, it is likely that new questions
will be raised concerning the limited availability of alternatives to SRO-
directed arbitration. 56 This potential is clearly visible through the growing
use of mediation as an alternative to arbitration in securities disputes, 57 and
through the growing number of people who view mediation as the
"expeditious, cost-effective alternative to arbitration." 58
53 See Securities Industry Association, supra note 9.
54 See Gross, supra note 10, at 338.
55 See Schachle v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. G032194, 2005
WL 1822517 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2005); Gorman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. H027488, 2005 WL 1576869 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. July 5,
2005).
56 See Gross, supra note 10, at 339.
57 Id. at 340.
5 8 1d. at 344 (quoting DAVID ROBBINS, SECuRIEs ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
MANUAL § 16-1 (5th ed. 2003)).
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V. CONCLUSION
In Jevne, the California Supreme Court acknowledged the supremacy of
SEC-endorsed SRO procedures for the arbitration of securities-related
disputes. The immediate effect of this holding will be a continuation of
adherence to SRO guidelines, but without the confusion and apprehension
associated with the potential for challenges from state laws. The long-term
impact will likely include an exploration of alternative means of attacking the
SROs' supremacy, as well as an exploration of alternatives to arbitration as
the most common means of resolving securities-related disputes.
Hawken Flanagan
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